

---

# All eyes on quality defensives

---

European equities | February 2024

---



**Paul Doyle**  
Head of Large Cap European Equities

- **Equity markets have rallied, inflation is falling, interest rates are peaking, and 2024 rate cuts are already priced into markets**
- **A recession in the US remains likely, while Europe is better positioned**
- **Once interest rates are cut, a new market cycle will begin – although inflation and rates will remain higher than the past decade**

Equity markets have been strong recently, as the equity risk premium has fallen. The consensus expects more than 150 basis points (bps) of US interest rate cuts in 2024, which is more than the Federal Reserve (Fed) has indicated. The US high yield credit spread, the best indicator of risk appetite, shrank from 600bps to 350bps over 2023.<sup>1</sup> Monetary policy works with a lag: we have not yet felt the full effect of restrictive policy.

US inflation is falling: the Fed forecasts core inflation of 3.2% at end-2024, and 2.4% at end-2025.<sup>2</sup> Just as it takes a long time for rises to have an impact, so it will for cuts. The Fed forecasts restrictive policy even in 2025.

Capital expenditure and employment trends will determine whether the US will see a mild recession. Regional bank surveys point to cracks in capital expenditure and we are close to triggering the Sahm Rule (Figure 1), the Fed's indicator of when a recession is starting.<sup>3</sup>

Sentiment is bullish, however, with the US market on more than 20x forward earnings, and assuming 11% growth in 2024<sup>4</sup>, the market has priced a soft landing. Any disappointment will prompt a reaction. If the Fed cuts rates early it may reignite inflation, prompting renewed rate hikes. Wage growth is almost 5%: earnings are above trend and the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) suggests double-digit growth in 2024 and 2025.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Datastream, January 2024


<sup>2</sup> US Federal Reserve, January 2024

<sup>3</sup> The Sahm Recession Indicator: the start of a recession is when the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate rises by at least 0.50 percentage points relative to its low in the previous 12 months

<sup>4</sup> Datastream, January 2024

<sup>5</sup> IBES, January 2024

Figure 1: Unemployment is close to triggering the Sahm Rule



Source: US Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Note, shaded areas denote NBER-designated recessions.

The risk for the market is the double effect of earnings being revised lower and a derating after strong performance. In 2023, earnings were revised lower but the market rose anticipating a recovery. Margins remain high. PPI is negative so nominal earnings should fall. The US economy has been kept afloat by the consumer, even as excess pandemic savings dwindled to a quarter of their peak.

Lagged effects of monetary policy were prolonged by these pandemic savings, both for consumers and businesses. Panic pandemic decisions meant homeowners were able to refinance cheaply. The Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility allowed companies to extend debt maturities and lower interest costs, denting the effect of rate hikes and diminishing the pain of any recession. Unlike 2008 there are few private sector imbalances.

Covid support schemes have only delayed the effect of monetary policy changes, not avoided it. Consumer credit is weakening, new loans are performing worse than old, delinquencies on car loans are deteriorating, and so is credit card debt.

## Europe


In Europe, improved industrial activity – inventories bottoming and real wages picking up – may not last. Weak credit, falling capital expenditure and a negative fiscal impulse will bring a weaker 2024. However, the German manufacturing PMI has picked up due to recovering inventories. Global and Swedish new orders-to-inventories ratios are also up, consistent with short-term upturns in European manufacturing and Korean exports, indicating greater European activity. However, this may not be sustained.

Capital expenditure intentions are weakening, fiscal policy is restrictive and falling inflation is helping real wage growth, but this is unlikely to continue. Real wages shrank as inflation exceeded nominal wage growth. Credit flows, a negative fiscal effect of -0.8% of European GDP<sup>6</sup> (twice that experienced in 2023) and lower capital expenditure will undermine economic

<sup>6</sup> Bloomberg Finance LP/S&P Global, January 2024

improvement. Money supply has shrunk by 10%. It is a matter of time before this impacts the wider economy. Leading indicators of capital expenditure for 2024 are negative (Figure 2). The European Commission's Industry Survey points downwards. Inventories of finished goods send the same message.

Figure 2: Leading indicators are collapsing



Source: DG ECFN, January 2024

less capital expenditure. The market is pricing no recession so there's no room for disappointment. Liquidity continues to dry up (Figure 3).

Nominal wage growth will weaken as jobs growth deteriorates. The employment components of PMIs suggest a fall in demand for workers, so wage growth will roll over. Tight monetary policy will bite, and as in the US it will remain tight even if the ECB cuts rates in Q2.

### United States


The Fed has never before cut rates with inflation above 2% unless unemployment was over 5%. We are still on track for a mild recession unless rates are cut aggressively. Easy money is gone, and in the next recession rates will not fall to zero as they did in 2009. The market expects the Fed and the ECB to cut rates before a recession, but this is unlikely. Rates are likely to be higher over the course of the next decade than the last, when they were artificially low. The neutral rate of interest may be higher than central banks claim. The Fed adheres to its 2.5% long-term nominal funds rate yet the five-year/five-year forward suggests this is not credible.

The US equity risk premium is low largely due to the "Magnificent Seven"<sup>7</sup>, but not entirely. The stock market does not reflect the level of interest rates and this will become apparent if we enter a recession. US consumption will not fall because population growth is 0.5% per year (1.2% including migration). Private non-residential investment has a bigger swing effect though it is only 18% of US GDP compared to 70% for consumption.<sup>8</sup> Tightening lending conditions mean

<sup>7</sup> Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms, Microsoft, NVIDIA and Tesla

<sup>8</sup> Bloomberg, as at January 2024

Figure 3: US equities offer an extremely low risk premium – and not just due to tech stocks



Source: BCA Research, 2023. \*Equity risk premium defined as the difference between the 12-month forward earnings yield and US 10-year TIPS yields

The US has not yet triggered the Sahm Rule, but unemployment is rising in cyclical economies. The voluntary quit rate has fallen, indicating rising unemployment, and though initial claims have not risen, continuing claims are high. Companies are not yet laying people off, but they are reluctant to hire.

Higher rates mean tougher lending standards for business. Commercial and industrial loans were flat in 2023. Loan growth lags bank lending standards by a year, so we expect lower business lending this year. Bankruptcy filings are the highest since 2010. The 12-month trailing default rate for high-yield borrowers has risen from 1.2% to 5.2%.<sup>9</sup> Credit losses on credit cards and auto loans have risen for seven quarters. US banks are well capitalised, but we expect problems if a recession comes.

## China

China's problem is property: the US property market is worth \$60 trillion, double GDP, while the Chinese property market is \$100 trillion, six times GDP. Most consumer savings have gone into property markets, but 130 million units lie empty. Housing starts and home sales were 20%

<sup>9</sup> BCA Research, 2023


lower in 2023 than 2022. The Chinese GDP deflator is -1.4%: deflation is persistent so real borrowing costs have risen, though nominal lending rates have fallen.<sup>10</sup>

Local government revenues are falling as land sales collapse. New credit was 27% of GDP in 2023 – but this is not helping a recovery. Debt costs are 21% of disposable income so consumers and businesses are unwilling to borrow more. It is difficult for consumption – 38% of GDP – to take up the slack when capital expenditure (42%) and exports (20%) are falling. China's construction and infrastructure boom drove 20 years of global growth. Of the world's 2.6% real annual growth over the past 10 years, 1.1% came from China – only 0.6% came from the US and 0.2% from the eurozone. Without real estate and infrastructure investment, China's contribution will be 0.5% at best.<sup>11</sup>

### Where do we go from here?

The US market has never looked so expensive relative to the rest of the world, and relative to bonds. Defensives are poised for outperformance – in November and December yields fell but defensives suffered. A weak China is driving emerging markets to new lows relative to developed markets. The Eurostoxx 50 added 20% in 2023 but primary equity capital markets business halved. Smaller companies rallied in late 2023 and the UK equity market looks cheap. Liquidity continues to fall with G5 balance sheets shrinking by \$5.2 trillion over the past six quarters. Yield curves in western bond markets inverted 15 months ago.

Figure 4: MSCI US 12-month FWD P/E relative to World ex US



Source: Bloomberg, January 2024

<sup>10</sup> BCA Research, 2023

<sup>11</sup> BCA Research, 2023

Once we get to the other side, the picture gets more positive. Reshoring manufacturing to the US will lead to capital expenditure. McKinsey says net zero requires \$275 trillion of US spending between now and 2050. The retirement of baby boomers will drive down savings and raise interest rates.

The same is true to a lesser degree in Europe. Two-thirds of European companies expect to increase operations in Europe over the next three years, while almost the same proportion expect to increase R&D spending. Europe has under-invested in its capital stock since the global financial crisis. This is particularly acute in Germany where the age of corporate capital stock is more than seven years. Meanwhile, the private sector in Europe is liquid and cash-rich, with financial assets more than 450% of GDP. Inflation and risk-free rates will be higher than the last decade: reshoring is inflationary, as is a labour shortage.

In conclusion, the short-term picture may be challenging with defensive stocks outperforming. However, when aggressive interest rate cuts begin, Europe may again outperform. Longer term, the NextGenerationEU plan, the use of AI to boost productivity, and increased capital expenditure may kickstart European growth.



### Important Information

#### **For use by professional clients and/or equivalent investor types in your jurisdiction (not to be used with or passed on to retail clients). For marketing purposes.**

This document is intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered representative of any particular investment. This should not be considered an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any securities or other financial instruments, or to provide investment advice or services. Investing involves risk including the risk of loss of principal. Your capital is at risk. Market risk may affect a single issuer, sector of the economy, industry or the market as a whole. The value of investments is not guaranteed, and therefore an investor may not get back the amount invested. International investing involves certain risks and volatility due to potential political, economic or currency fluctuations and different financial and accounting standards. The securities included herein are for illustrative purposes only, subject to change and should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell. Securities discussed may or may not prove profitable. The views expressed are as of the date given, may change as market or other conditions change and may differ from views expressed by other Columbia Threadneedle Investments (Columbia Threadneedle) associates or affiliates. Actual investments or investment decisions made by Columbia Threadneedle and its affiliates, whether for its own account or on behalf of clients, may not necessarily reflect the views expressed. This information is not intended to provide investment advice and does not take into consideration individual investor circumstances. Investment decisions should always be made based on an investor's specific financial needs, objectives, goals, time horizon and risk tolerance. Asset classes described may not be suitable for all investors. Past performance does not guarantee future results, and no forecast should be considered a guarantee either. Information and opinions provided by third parties have been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed. This document and its contents have not been reviewed by any regulatory authority.

**In Australia:** Issued by Threadneedle Investments Singapore (Pte.) Limited ["TIS"], ARBN 600 027 414. TIS is exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services licence under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and relies on Class Order 03/1102 in respect of the financial services it provides to wholesale clients in Australia. This document should only be distributed in Australia to "wholesale clients" as defined in Section 761G of the Corporations Act. TIS is regulated in Singapore (Registration number: 201101559W) by the Monetary Authority of Singapore under the Securities and Futures Act (Chapter 289), which differ from Australian laws.

**In Singapore:** Issued by Threadneedle Investments Singapore (Pte.) Limited, 3 Killiney Road, #07-07, Winsland House 1, Singapore 239519, which is regulated in Singapore by the Monetary Authority of Singapore under the Securities and Futures Act (Chapter 289). Registration number: 201101559W. This advertisement has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

**In Hong Kong:** Issued by Threadneedle Portfolio Services Hong Kong Limited 天利投資管理香港有限公司. Unit 3004, Two Exchange Square, 8 Connaught Place, Hong Kong, which is licensed by the Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") to conduct Type 1 regulated activities (CE:AQA779). Registered in Hong Kong under the Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622), No. 1173058.

**In Japan:** Issued by Columbia Threadneedle Investments Japan Co., Ltd. Financial Instruments Business Operator, The Director-General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (FIBO) No.3281, and a member of Japan Investment Advisers Association and Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association.

**In the UK:** Issued by Threadneedle Asset Management Limited, No. 573204 and/or Columbia Threadneedle Management Limited, No. 517895, both registered in England and Wales and authorised and regulated in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority.

**In the EEA:** Issued by Threadneedle Management Luxembourg S.A., registered with the Registre de Commerce et des Sociétés (Luxembourg), No. B 110242 and/or Columbia Threadneedle Netherlands B.V., regulated by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), registered No. 08068841.

**In Switzerland:** Issued by Threadneedle Portfolio Services AG, an unregulated Swiss firm or Columbia Threadneedle Management (Swiss) GmbH, acting as representative office of Columbia Threadneedle Management Limited, authorised and regulated by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA).

**In the Middle East:** This document is distributed by Columbia Threadneedle Investments (ME) Limited, which is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA). The information in this document is not intended as financial advice and is only intended for persons with appropriate investment knowledge who meet the regulatory criteria to be classified as a Professional Client or Market Counterparty and no other person should act upon it. This document and its contents and any other information or opinions subsequently supplied or given to you are strictly confidential and for the sole use of those attending the presentation. It may not be reproduced in any form or passed on to any third party without the express written permission of CTIME. By accepting delivery of this presentation, you agree that it is not to be copied or reproduced in whole or in part and that you will not disclose its contents to any other person.

This document may be made available to you by an affiliated company which is part of the Columbia Threadneedle Investments group of companies: Columbia Threadneedle Management Limited in the UK; Columbia Threadneedle Netherlands B.V., regulated by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), registered No. 08068841.

**Columbia Threadneedle Investments is the global brand name of the Columbia and Threadneedle group of companies.**

[columbiathreadneedle.com](http://columbiathreadneedle.com)

02.24 | CTEA6363782.1